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Within the discussion and research on the nature of knowledge lies the highly debated 
issue of the relationship between ethics and scientific knowledge. In this paper I try to 
problematize this relationship with the help of the Aristotelian concept of knowledge 
and ethics. This concept makes the distinction between scientific knowledge 
(episteme), productive knowledge (techne), and practical wisdom (phronesis). 
(Aristotle, nicomachean ethics, chapter 6, (2002) Oxford university press, introduction 
by Sarah Baoadie.) 
Episteme is mainly defined in a strict scientific sense, as the description and 
explanation of scientific truths and are therefore constant and cannot be otherwise. 
Mathematics is the ideal science. Techne is defined as practical-productive 
knowledge, creativity, production or handicrafts. Phronesis is defined as”to know how 
to act in the best way in concrete, specific situations”. (Nussbaum, Martha (1993), 
Passions and perceptions, Cambridge, Cambridge university press). These three 
forms of knowledge can also be described as different virtues (areté), which can be 
defined as the skills we develop in our various fields of work. In science we develop 
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episteme, in handicraft techne and in ethics and politics we develop phronesis.  
In relation to the problem we have presented we can say here that in every activity in 
which we are involved we have to apply all three forms of virtues or forms of 
knowledge. I have personally studied a number of different forms of education and 
found these three forms to be present in different combinations and in relation to what 
is most beneficial to that specific education or activity, such as shipbuilding, vocational 
teaching or scientific study. (Gustavsson, Bernt, (2003) Knowledge in practice, 
published in Swedish).  
Therefore, the question of which branch of knowledge should be applied in 
which society can be answered as follows: in every form of education, community, 
workplace or context, we have to apply the most beneficial forms of knowledge in 
relation to that specific society or context.  
Today we live in a situation were we can distance ourselves from our own 
context or society and learn from others. In a specific scientific field or a specific 
university, or a specific nation; in specific parts of the world, we find different 
perspectives available. We are always contextualised in some of them and have our 
preferences, however, at the same time we have the possibility to go beyond the 
already acquainted and meet what is new and foreign to us. In today’s globalised 
society this is an expanding possibility.  
If we look closer at the meaning of phronesis we can find that practical 
judgement developed in a hermeneutic tradition means how we make interpretations 
of reality from: a specific situation, the particular context or situation we are in, meet 
the general or the universal, what is open for different interpretations. This is 
relativistic in the first step, when we allow different interpretations to speak. The next 
step is the critical stage: when we have to debate, often in conflict, between the most 
valid interpretation. (Ricoeur, Paul, (1983), Time and Narrative, Volume III. Chicago, 
Chicago university press.) 
The general problem here can be expressed in terms of the relation between 
the particular and the universal. Interpreted as an ethical problem, related to the 
problem of knowledge, we have here a core problem of our time. In ethical terms we 
can, from an Aristotelian view, say that ethics and right action is contextualised in our 
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own community. On the universal side, aspects such as human rights, criteria for 
social justice, or even some universal human values, such as the right to develop our 
capabilities, have to be taken into account. (Nussbaum, Martha (2000), Woman and 
human development: the capabilities approach, Cambridge university press).  
If we look at the advanced discussion about democracy in contemporary 
globalised society today, we can find defenders either of the particular (in terms of 
communities, identities, cultures), or of the universal (rights, justice, capabilities). 
Some philosophers and researchers try to find relationships in these two standpoints 
in the hope of bridging the existing divide. For the question of ethics and democracy 
we can follow Ricoeur when he, in his ethics formulates it briefly:”a good life, with and 
for others, in just institutions”. A good life: the nebulous of our dreams and ideals, in 
friendship with others, in just institutions. This is an area of ethics which combines and 
relates the difference and the general, the particular and the universal. (Ricoeur, Paul, 
(1992), Oneself as another, Chicago university press). 
In this sense we can regard science in the universal sense, together with all the 
differences we have to live with, in all its richness and fruitfulness. 
If we put forward the question of what we actually mean by knowledge in a 
knowledge-based society, we can, from this reasoning, say that a democratic society 
based on knowledge has to be built on the reciprocal recognition and respect for 
different forms of knowledge, used in different forms of activities and education. The 
main criteria for answering the question; which knowledge in which society has to be: 
what is most fruitful for this specific society or context? (Gustavsson, Bernt, (2000) 
Philosophy of knowledge, published in Swedish and Danish). 
The ethics of this conclusion is to recognise every context from its own habits, 
customs, traditions, or culture. But, in order to develop the specific context it has to 
develop itself in dialogue and in a fruitful relation to the other. Just as no human being 
is an island, neither is any society in a globalised world. The main ambition in 
developing a society is to give the citizens the opportunity to build their own 
capabilities from their own circumstances. 
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In this article I discuss the relation between knowledge, ethics and democracy. 
Knowledge from a wider, Aristotelian perspective is divided between scientific 
knowledge (episteme), productive knowledge (techne) and practical wisdom or ethical 
knowledge (phronesis). A democratic knowledge-based society can be built on the 
reciprocal recognition of different forms of knowledge. In the concept of phronesis we 
find the relationship between the particular and the universal. Human rights, criteria for 
justice, and some human values can be considered universal. Different contexts, 
identities and forms of understanding are particular. The relationship between them is 
the core of the democratic problem in a globalised world.  
 
Different forms of knowledge 
When we look at the sources for the differences in perspectives on knowledge we see 
two forms of understanding. Epistemology usually defines the very problem of 
knowledge in platonic terms: How can we justify our beliefs, what we think is true, to 
make our beliefs (doxa) into true or objective knowledge (episteme)? The definition of 
knowledge is justified true belief. Here the intellect is working, emancipated from our 
body and our feelings, the knowledge produced is that “which cannot be otherwise”, 
eternal and universal.1  
The concept for the knowledge we use in making things is techne, i.e. practical-
productive knowledge. This form of knowledge is most widespread in the current labour 
market: the understanding of professional knowledge. But, then we ask if there exists a 
kind of knowledge we use when we work socially or culturally. The concept which, 
today, generally applies to ethical and political knowledge is phronesis, or practical 
wisdom2  
What we find in the Aristotelian tradition is that knowledge is not something 
highly abstract, but is built into the contexts and activities we are involved in. The 
question of which branch of knowledge should be applied in which society can be 
answered thus: every form of education, community, workplace or context, the most 
beneficial forms of knowledge has to be applied in relation to that specific society or 
                                                 
1 Plato, Theaetetus, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973) 
2 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Wordsworth 1996 
 Proceedings of the 4th International Barcelona Conference on Higher Education 
Vol. 1 . Ethics and releva nce of scientific knowledge: what 
knowledge for what society? 





context. There is a specific discussion about scientific knowledge, which today can be 
understood from many different perspectives, depending on what field of science we 
work in, what aim we have and what kind of problems we aim to solve. What we have 
to realize is that this is a richness which gives us improved possibilities of finding the 
most fruitful perspective, in relation to our aim, problem and the area in which we work. 
This approach not only illustrates the diversity of possibilities of what we can 
use in different professions and educations. It is also a reaction against the tendency to 
reduce knowledge into a commodity that is bought and sold on the market. Knowledge 
has an increasing exchange value in a knowledge based society, but is, 
simultaneously, losing its intrinsic or utility value.3In contemporary educational policies 
there is a strong tendency to believe that, from the outset, one can predict what forms 
of knowledge will be progressive. This is an out-dated insight, which I believe is no 
longer valid, for the simple reason that if you know from the beginning what the result 
of your research is going to be, why then carry out any research at all, as the results 
are already known.4 Searching for knowledge, or developing new knowledge takes 
time, it is a question of long and free processes, removed from all debates about 
efficiency and quick profits. 
 When knowledge and learning is treated as a commodity in the market, it is 
reduced to its economic value, and loses its democratic and humanistic dimensions in 
society and in the educational system. A rich and democratic society is built on the 
insight that there are different forms of knowledge which are adapted to the aim we 
have with our activity and in turn have a richness of perspectives of knowledge. 
Knowledge is carried by human beings. That is the very difference between 
information and knowledge. Information is something we find in databases, in books or 
when we carry out an interview. Information is transformed into knowledge by an 
individual who makes interpretations and understands information within a context 
which in turn gives it meaning. This is the precondition for being able to use the 
knowledge we have, in practice, the very sign of that we have transformed information 
into our own knowledge. 
                                                 
3 Lyotard, The postmodern condition, : A Report on Knowledge (Manchester university press 1979, 1984)  
4 Recognised already by Plato 
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The huge rift in the educational system based on class and race is the division 
between theory and practice, education and training. This is a very deeply seated 
tradition, based on the idea that theoretical knowledge is of more value than practical 
knowledge. Today, this historical fact is changing in many ways.i The very fact that 
practical knowledge is recognized as knowledge in its own right is one of the reasons. 
The literature produced by practical knowledge is huge and is treated in many different 
concepts. Here, I will give a short overview of this discussion.5  
 
Productive knowledge 
The conceptions of productive knowledge, or professional knowledge, is today many. 
One of the most dominant in this field is tacit knowledge. What do we mean when we 
say that something is tacit, such as in tacit knowledge? It is not silent knowledge; tacit 
is something which is pre-understood as a background to what we are doing. Tacit 
knowledge is in one understanding the background knowledge we have when we are 
doing or making something, such as when I use a tool in relation to a material. When I 
am hammering a nail I have the focus directed on what I am doing, this is focal 
knowledge. But the fact that I know how to use a hammer, for what and when is 
background knowledge. In this sense tacit knowledge is built into different handicraft 
traditions, usually over very long periods of time. But the same thing happens when I 
try to solve a scientific problem, I have my concentration focused on the very problem. 
But how to treat it or solve it is related to how it is treated before, according to scientific 
traditions. There is always some kind of pre-understanding in what we learn or do.6 
Another conception of tacit knowledge is dividing between what is possible to say, in 
verbal terms, and what is “unsayable”, but possible to show in what we are doing, what 
is shown and visible, and what can be interpreted in art or handicraft.7 Many seminars 
in Sweden in this school of thought are carried out in the form of dialogues between 
people who are researchers and those who work with art, music, handicraft or other 
different professions. 
                                                 
5 This is partly brought from my book The philosophy of knowledge, published in Swedish 
6 Polanyi, The tacit dimension   (Peter Smith 1983). 
7 Bo Göranzon, The practical intellect, (London, Springer 1993) 
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One of the most influential concepts from the 80’s and up until the present is the 
reflective practitioner. This is a reaction against the methods of solving problems in 
industrial society, when a technical or a scientific expert is invited to solve the problem 
in a workplace. The practitioners having to form their own reflections are the answer 
and alternative. Since so many professions are changing in terms of new techniques 
and organization the skills have to be inherent in the labour force, so the practitioner 
has to build his or her own reflection based upon what they are doing. The division 
here is between routine based work and reflected work, a necessity in a changing 
profession.8  
Many thinkers and researchers formulate this division in different ways, either 
we just act as we are used to, or we reflect on what we are doing in order to improve it 
or change it. This is the main idea in the pragmatic tradition. Knowledge has its origin in 
what we do, when we act, and when we encounter a problem or have to change our 
habits, or are surprised, we have to reflect, in order to act in another way. 9Another 
perspective on practical learning or knowledge is to say that when we learn something 
we do it in the situations, contexts or practices we are involved in. It means that when 
we learn a profession we have to learn it in the context where it is practiced, to learn a 
profession is to be socialized into it.10 
From this perspective we can then ask the more general question: if we are just 
socialized into something, where, then are the opportunities for reshaping what we 
have been socialized into and get a critical distance from it. 
 
Ethical knowledge 
We are socialized into the society, culture and traditions in which we are brought up. 
Can we therefore say that we are just products of this society and ought to think in 
terms of what is prescribed by tradition? This suggests an authoritarian view. There is 
in the democratic tradition an ideal about the personal autonomy, the capability of 
                                                 
8 Schön, The reflective practitioner, : How professionals think in action (Ashgate 1983, 1991). 
 Ryle, G, The concept of mind (Penguin 1949, 1990).  
9 Dewey, Democracy and education, (Free press 1916,1966) 
10 Lave, J, Situated learning: : Legitimate peripheral participation  (Cambridge university press 1991). 
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being critical towards what we are told to be true. This is the distinction in the third 
concept of knowledge, phronesis, or practical wisdom. 11We are, so to speak, carriers 
of the habits and traditions in our societies, but today many would say that the aim of 
education is to encourage the development of a critical capability. This has to do with 
globalization, when the relationship between the local and the global comes into 
question. 
Many people today express in different ways that the first duty of education is to 
develop the ability to be critical: critical competence. The reasons are several. We are 
not just introduced into something or educated in a certain tradition. We have the 
possibility of reflecting on this tradition in a critical way. If we have the ambition to 
educate citizens, not just citizens in a local or national society but world citizens, we 
cannot stay within the boundaries of our own traditions. If we do not study other 
traditions ultimately it will result in us not knowing anything about ourselves either.12 If I 
am in South Africa and come back to Sweden I look at Sweden through different eyes. 
The place I return to is not the same place as the one I departed from.  
What is then phronesis? What does it mean to be a wise human being in a 
community? The question and point of departure for an answer to that question is: how 
do we act in the best way in order to improve our communities? How do we know how 
to act? Another word for practical wisdom is practical judgement. To have good 
judgement is to use our general knowledge in specific, concrete situations. We can 
suppose that a person with a great deal of life experience is in a good position to use 
those previous experiences when a decision has to be made on how to act in the best 
way. This is the understanding of practical wisdom, almost general, or universal in the 
world. In Africa, I am told, it is often women who carry the traditions and the stories of 
the group or community.  
So we can say that this form of knowledge is traditionally formed by human 
beings, in social or cultural traditions. It has its origin in real life, outside the educational 
system. But what is happening today is that this form of knowledge is being introduced 
                                                 
11 This is the difference between the communitarians and Martha Nussbaum  
12 Nussbaum, M, Cultivating humanity, Cultivating Humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal 
education, Harvard university press 1997) 
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into education. The reason for that could be formulated thus: that we are scientifically 
and technically advanced in modern society, but what there is a need for is the 
knowledge concerning how we can apply this knowledge which would be most 
beneficial for the community and for humanity. 
The educational means for this introduction in many professional forms of 
education is literature, narratives, stories, and literature, what we can call “the indirect 
way to experience”. How is one, for instance, to educate a good lawyer? 13You learn 
the law and the rules, that is the general, but to apply the laws in specific, concrete 
cases, you must make decisions and this requires a wide and deep experience of life. If 
you haven’t been able to gain these experiences in your own life, you can read about 
those of others. That is what good literature is about. 
Up to now we have seen that the conception and understanding of knowledge is 
becoming wider and that today we can talk about three forms of knowledge. We can 
see how the discussion about knowledge takes place in three strands, one directed to 
research and science, one to learning and knowledge in labour, and one in ethics and 
politics.  
In universities, in health care, there are ethical boards. In science, if we take for 
instance gene technology, scientists are working scientifically and the ethical boards 
have to handle the ethical questions. Science in that sense is traditionally free from 
values – the very fact that it is free from values is indeed a defining aspect of science. 
This is the significance of science. The most significant sign of techne, or practical-
productive knowledge is competence, skills and efficiency.  
The sign for practical wisdom is value-based action. We cannot act ethically 
without having certain criteria for what is good for ourselves, the community and 
humanity. If we look at the huge discussion about ethics, we can recognise three 
schools, or traditions. The most influential is utilitarianism or consequence ethics, 
where the measure of good action is what the consequences are in terms of utility. 
Increase the luck and diminish the suffering. The second rule is duty ethics. From a 
general rule, “act as if the imperative of your action could be a general law”, you can 
                                                 
13 Nussbaum, M, Poetic justice, Poetic Justice: The Literary imagination and Public Life, (Beacon Press 
1995) 
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develop a universal ethics for humanity. The third alternative is virtue ethics which tells 
us about the concrete situation and making good judgments to be able to act in a good 
way.14 
 Supposing first, we are here allowed to be value-based. We can acknowledge 
that our values and traditions are contextualised in the communities in which we live. 
This is the focus on the local and the specific, the particular. The particular marks the 
parameters of clean virtue ethics. But at the same time, if we go to the universal side, 
and say that we have to have universal rules, there is little or no consideration for the 
local circumstances or the context, or the specific traditions.  
This is the main problem today in a world of globalization. It is both a problem 
about knowledge and about ethics and politics. When you look at the intellectual 
discussion we can see how many take a position either for the local or the global, the 
particular or the universal. 
In the question of knowledge, scientific knowledge is presented as universal. If I 
am carrying out an experiment and have the same conditions in different places and in 
different times and have the same result, the knowledge produced can be considered 
to be universally valid. Consider, in relation to this example, the discussion of 
indigenous knowledge, which is often presented to be local and bound to a certain 
context. This discussion can be continued to include lifestyles, religions, and cultures. 
The most interesting question here is how we can look at and analyze this relationship 
between the universal and the particular, the local and the global. 15 
 
Democracy 
If we look closer at the meaning of phronesis we can find that practical judgement 
developed in a hermeneutic tradition means how we make interpretations of reality 
from a specific situation, the particular context or situation we are in, meet the general 
or the universal, what is open for different interpretations. The general problem here 
can be expressed in terms of the relation between the particular and the universal. 
Interpreted as an ethical problem, related to the problem of knowledge, we have here a 
                                                 
14 The core of phronesis is to relate the particular case from the general knowledge we have 
15 Elsewhere, in Odora Hoppers, I have written about how this can be understood in relation to the 
democratic problem  
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core problem of our time. In ethical terms we can from an Aristotelian view say that 
ethics and right action is contextualised in our own community. On the universal side, 
aspects such as human rights, criteria for social justice, or even some universal human 
values, such as the right to develop our capabilities, have to be taken into account.16  
If we look at the advanced discussion about democracy in contemporary 
globalised society today, we can find defenders either of the particular (in terms of 
communities, identities, cultures), or of the universal (rights, justice, capabilities). Some 
philosophers and researchers try to find relationships in these two standpoints in the 
hope of bridging the existing divide.  
Scientific knowledge has most often the ambition to be universal. At the same 
time certain forms of knowledge are local and dependent on context in different forms 
of praxis and situations. That is the case if we talk about situated cognition, practical 
wisdom or indigenous knowledge. How can we then look upon the problem that 
knowledge can be considered to be both universal and local or situated in the 
particular? I would say that the most interesting contemporary research and philosophy 
have the ambition to communicate and transcend this contradiction, dichotomy, tension 
or whatever we call it. Let me exemplify with human rights. Human rights are 
universally formulated but at the same time they are often invoked by western powers 
to assert a superior position while they remain necessary for the democratic 
development of the world. Spivak’s conclusion is both appreciation and criticism, so 
that we “never stop criticizing that which one does not not want” is her concluding 
statement on human rights.17 
The idea that democratic and human rights issues should be a concern for all 
countries and peoples of the world is a point of view that is held by many. This 
indicates that the democratic tradition has universal values and advocates rights which 
can be interpreted into all local and individual contexts. In recent years Nussbaum has 
defended universal values with a focus on women who have been oppressed by local 
cultures on the Indian subcontinent. ii She supports her theory with help from the 
economist, Amartya Sen and presents a universal theory on human development 
                                                 
16 Representativs in contemporary discussion are Rawls, Nussbaum, Sen, Habermas  
17 Maclean, L: The Spivak reader, (Routledge, 1996) 
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based on the founding idea that people are given the opportunity to develop their own 
capabilities. Sen states that this is a central criterion for forming the freedoms which 
are necessary for the development of democratic societies in poor countries.18 These 
freedoms encompass all aspects of life from an acceptable standard of living, a good 
standard of health as well as being able to express emotions, feelings within the 
community and have control of one’s own private life. 
Seyla Benhabib is an advocate of this standpoint, she illustrates in a way which 
sees the universal opening towards the particular and criticizing its uncommunicative 
qualities. Her main focus of attention is drawn towards the problem of group identities 
becoming given truths which then remain static for all future generations (1996). 
Benhabib also opposes any attempts to preserve the purity and uniqueness of cultures 
claiming that they are not compatible with democratic discussions and evaluations. 
Cultures are established through taking part in complex dialogues with other cultures; 
therefore democratic inclusion and preserving cultural characteristics need not exclude 
one another. Sensitivity towards cultural demands and a strong universalistic 
standpoint can be unified. She defends a modified form of deliberative democracy 
based on the norms of universal respect and mutual egalitarianism. Established norms 
are understood by the participants in a discussion based on the particular situation they 
find themselves in. This implies that when universal norms are interpreted they are 
determined according to each particular situation.19  
In Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another he addresses the need to think of oneself as 
another and another as oneself. Ricoeur is aware, when presenting this idea, of its 
contrasting position and criticism of Levina’s theory on the involuntary situation where 
one must choose between oneself or the other. Ethics includes, or rather takes its point 
of departure in self appreciation and self respect, which in this case becomes a 
prerequisite for a relationship with the other. 
The fundamental task of ethics can be summarized in one sentence: to achieve 
“a good life, with and for others in just institutions”. A good life is described as “the 
                                                 
18 Amartya Sen , Development as Freedom, (New York, Knopf, 1999)  
 
19 Benhabib, S: The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era, (Princeton university press 
2002) 
 Proceedings of the 4th International Barcelona Conference on Higher Education 
Vol. 1 . Ethics and releva nce of scientific knowledge: what 
knowledge for what society? 





nebula of ideals and dreams of what we would like to achieve, which refers to what a 
life can be when it is more or less complete”.iii This means that the individual, practical 
actions and the desires which influence our options in differing situations should be 
seen in the light of our entire lives, our narratives. People are regarded as self 
interpreting beings who interpret their lives by means of the stories they tell. Here 
practical judgement is broadened to a never ending series of interpretations of what it 
is to be a human being, in which our actions and our way of living become part of a 
whole story of life.20 
However the good life for the individual will remain an abstraction if it is not 
related to a life with and for others. Caring for the other is contingent on an appreciation 
of the individual’s own value. The self and the other relate to each other unconditionally 
in a state which is characterized by the dialogue. This ideal relationship can be found in 
Aristotle’s concept of friendship. Here the ideal friendship has its own value, a person 
who wishes good upon another with no other intention than improving the best interests 
of the individual in question. This is a situation where two parties are in an equal 
relationship with each other, a mutual giving and receiving, based on trust. The entire 
discussion on social trust and its implications for democracy has its origins in the 
Aristotelian concept of friendship. 
The friendship experienced between close friends, a personal relationship, 
should be regarded as separate from social friendship; nevertheless it lies in close 
proximity to the righteous by the nature of its mutual equality. The righteous 
relationship is given by means of their equality. Any friendship which is consistently 
defined as a just, mutual relationship requires the establishment of equitable 
institutions.iv  In this way it distinguishes itself from a close personal relationship. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have from an alternative understanding of knowledge in contemporary 
society, and tried to show the relation between knowledge, ethics and democracy. This 
alternative is informed by the ambition to transcend the division between theory and 
                                                 
20 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as another, p. 174ff.  (The university of Chicago Press 1992) 
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practice, mind and body, brain and hand. A learning or cognition process starts from 
where and who we are. Knowledge is information or practices incorporated into our 
minds and bodies which includes a personal understanding as a precondition to apply it 
in practice. Knowledge takes place in different contexts, practices and situations, but 
cannot be reduced to these contexts. There is always a human being, reflecting 
critically and developing herself in activities meaningful both for the individual and 
society. We are always acting and thinking both individually and culturally, depending 
on the contexts in which we live. The particular individual we are or the local 
community we live in is today in one way or another dependent and related to the 
global and universal. This relationship between the particular and the universal is the 
great challenge today to treat in dialogue, in order to build a good life, with and for 
others, in just and fair institutions. A good life, the nebulosa of our dreams and ideals, 
in friendship with others, in a society built on justice and human rights. This is the basic 
aim for working with knowledge, learning and community work. The sum of a 
democratic ambition. 
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